tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-49890063019655702352024-03-13T07:44:11.052-07:00Rockville Law: Maryland, D.C., and Virginia Business Law & Litigation<p align="center">Litigation & Business Law Commentary from Jeffrey D. Goldstein of Smith, Goldstein, LLC, Rockville and Towson, Maryland</p>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.comBlogger48125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-52573660641232542822018-01-14T15:00:00.001-08:002018-01-14T15:00:47.039-08:00Governor Hogan appoints David W. Lease to be Circuit Court Judge<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="1600" data-original-width="1200" height="320" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-a8H_rxuFD0g/WlvgfTwiXZI/AAAAAAAABT4/Zl0eERvO48UBwVE5vt20RnxCn5zufryDACLcBGAs/s320/David%2BInvitation.jpg" width="240" /><a href="http://governor.maryland.gov/2017/12/11/governor-larry-hogan-announces-judicial-appointments-19/" target="_blank">Governor Hogan's Press Release</a></div>
<br />
Maryland Governor Larry Hogan has appointed David W. Lease of our firm to be a Judge on the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Maryland. Judge Designate Lease's investiture ceremony is Friday, January 19, 2018 at the Circuit Court in Rockville.Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-15519865322613435192016-12-17T14:29:00.000-08:002016-12-17T14:29:09.402-08:00Federal Indictment in BitTorrent CasesThe lawyers behind those extortionate BitTorrent cases have been indicted: <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/919201/download" target="_blank">Indictment</a>.Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-87473940648912946212015-02-16T08:48:00.000-08:002015-02-16T08:48:57.313-08:00Anti-Spam Law: Beyond Systems Loses at the Fourth Circuit<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
On February 4, 2015, the United States District Court for
the Fourth Circuit put what is hopefully the final nail in the coffin for Beyond
Systems and its “litigation as a business model” ISP business. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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The Court affirmed the 2012 District Court Judgment which
had ended Beyond Systems’ lawsuit regarding alleged SPAM email it "received" regarding Kraft Foods’ Gevalia coffee. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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The Court held that the District Court was correct that
Beyond Systems “consented to the harm it claims it suffered. . . . Beyond
Systems created fake e-mail addresses, solely for the purpose of gathering
spam, … it embedded these addresses in websites, … it increased its e-mail
storage capacity to retain huge volumes of spam, … by which it hoped to
increase its eventual recovery under anti-spam statutes.” The Court's opinion is <a href="http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/132137.P.pdf" target="_blank">here.</a><o:p></o:p></div>
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I previously wrote about this case <a href="http://rockvillelaw.blogspot.com/2012/07/anti-spam-ruling-maryland-federal-jury.html" target="_blank">Here</a> and <a href="http://rockvillelaw.blogspot.com/2007/09/new-developments-in-anti-spam-law-spam.html" target="_blank">Here</a>.</div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-5417417873459484922013-08-13T15:12:00.001-07:002013-08-13T15:12:07.181-07:00White Flint Mall Litigation - Lord & Taylor Sues to Halt Bethesda/Rockville Redevelopment Project; Mall Files Counterclaim for $1 Billion.<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Litigation regarding the
redevelopment of the White Flint Mall site is underway in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland.
The outcome of the case could significantly affect the planned redevelopment
of the North Bethesda/Kensington/Rockville, Maryland area in which the Mall has
operated for more than 30 years.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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Lord & Taylor has sued the
owner of that mall (White Flint Mall, LLLP – which in turn is owned by the
Lerner Enterprises and related persons and entities) alleging that the
redevelopment of the site is in violation of a Reciprocal Easement Agreement (“REA”).
The Mall has filed a counterclaim against Lord & Taylor alleging that the
department store is wrongfully interfering with the redevelopment of the site.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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Lord & Taylor’s argument is
that the REA precludes White Flint from changing the building and site without
Lord & Taylor’s permission. Lord & Taylor is seeking specific
enforcement of the REA, and a halt to the redevelopment. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
White Flint is seeking One Billion
Dollars ($1,000,000,000.00) from Lord & Taylor in damages on grounds that
Lord & Taylor has gone along with the redevelopment and not objected to it
until the redevelopment was already underway. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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In the meantime, the mall is
nearly empty. Only a handful of stores remain and anchor tenant Bloomingdales’
building was demolished earlier this year.
<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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The Greenberg Traurig firm
represents Lord & Taylor. Katten Muchin
Rosenman represents White Flint Mall. The judge assigned to the case is Roger W.
Titus, and the case number is 8:13-cv-01912-RWT. Copies of the pleadings are
available on PACER for a fee. If you don’t have PACER access, let me know and I
may be able to email you copies of the documents.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-59115494221693402642013-08-01T12:23:00.000-07:002013-08-01T12:23:01.279-07:00Employers Take Notice: New Maryland Wage Lien Law Changes the Landscape<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
In Maryland, effective October 1,
2013, there is an interesting new law which: (1) may become an effective tool
for employees to collect wages from recalcitrant employers, (2) may become a
real problem for employers, and (3) may overburden the court system.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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Under the new Wage Lien Law, an
employee can serve a notice of lien on an employer that has failed to pay
wages; and if the employer fails to contest the lien by filing an action in the
Circuit Court to dispute the lien, then the lien will become final. To pursue
collection on the lien, the employee must then file a lien statement with the
land records office for liens on real estate and with the Maryland State
Department of Assessments and Taxation for liens on personal property. The lien
will be enforceable like a UCC lien against personal property, or a Judgment
Lien against real property against the assets which have been liened. The
employee can also be awarded his legal fees associated with the lien case at
the Circuit Court hearing.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
A link to the Wage Lien Law is <a href="http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2013RS/bills/sb/sb0758t.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>: <o:p></o:p></div>
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Two definitions under the law are
of particular importance:<o:p></o:p></div>
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</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.5in;">The definition of
employer under the new law is expansive, and includes not only the corporate
entity for which the employee is working; but also the persons in control of
the entity and its payroll. Therefore,
the employee will be able to lien not only the assets of the business, but also
of these control persons.</span></li>
<li><o:p style="text-indent: 0.5in;">T</o:p><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">he definition of wages </span><u style="text-indent: 0.5in;">does not
include commission payments</u><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">. Therefore, these claims will typically not be very large unless the employee has tolerated not being paid for multiple pay periods.</span></li>
</ul>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<o:p> </o:p>The Circuit Court will be
required to adjudicate these employer lien challenges within 45 days of filing.
That is a very short time from filing to hearing for many of the already very busy
Circuit Courts. It will be interesting to see whether that timing requirement
is honored by the Courts, or whether they will simply schedule hearings in the
normal course and disregard the 45 day rule.</div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
One problem that I see is that if
an employee sends a notice that he is owed less a $1,500.00 or so in wages,
when he is not in fact owed that sum, or if it at least is a disputed claim,
will the employer spend the funds necessary to hire counsel to defend such a
claim? Or, will the employer settle with the employee or pay the employee the amount claimed simply in order to avoid the legal fees and costs of contesting the lien. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Under the law, if the employee’s
wage claim is frivolous, then the Court can award the employer its legal fees,
but it is often difficult to show that a claim is frivolous, and collecting
your legal fees from a disaffected (maybe unemployed?) former employee can be a
real challenge.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
If you are an employer who has
been served with a wage lien notice, it will be important to act quickly and
contact counsel to advise you as to how to proceed. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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For another perspective on this, and some links of interest, take a look at the blog post of a very experienced lawyer who pursues many wage collection claims for employees: <a href="http://mdemploymentlaw.blogspot.com/2013/07/maryland-wage-lien-act-powerful-new.html" target="_blank">Rubin Employment Law Blog</a><o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-64200525779674120872013-05-10T07:07:00.000-07:002013-05-10T07:07:08.254-07:00SpamLaw: Fourth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Foreign Banks from "Honey Pot" Internet Pharmacy Case<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">I have handled
defense of alleged email “spamming” cases in both state and federal
courts. Recently, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rendered an important opinion in regard
to the reach of court’s jurisdiction in these cases: <i>Unspam Technologies v. Chernuk</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">In <i>Unspam Technologies v. Chernuk, </i>the
Fourth Circuit upheld the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia’s dismissal of foreign banks that were alleged to have profited from a
spamming conspiracy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">The plaintiffs
in this case were a company formed for the purpose of pursuing enforcement of
Internet laws, and an Arlington, Virginia resident who claimed that he himself
was the victim of a spam conspiracy. The two plaintiffs specifically were
seeking to redress a global cyber-crime conspiracy “to use popular credit card
processing systems (particularly the Visa network) to collect funds from the
sale of illegal counterfeit prescription drugs over the Internet to American
consumers.” They alleged that consumers in the U.S., such as the individual
plaintiff, responded to email advertisements for prescription drugs and paid
for the drugs with credit cards. The Internet “pharmacists” then presented the
credit card transactions to Internet Payment Service Providers, which in turn presented
them to foreign banks participating in the international Visa network. The
banks collected on the charges from the consumers’ accounts through the Visa
network, but ultimately, the pharmacists never filled the orders for the
prescription drugs or filled them with counterfeit drugs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">The plaintiffs
argued that the frequency and nature of such transactions supported their claim
as to the existence of a global conspiracy that violated U.S. and Virginia law.
Plaintiffs agreed to the dismissal of one of the pharmacist defendants, and
failed to properly serve the other. The only defendants remaining on appeal
were foreign banks alleged to be integral to the conspiracy in that they were “responsible
for the vast majority of this illegal business extending over a number of
years” because they processed the largest number of transactions submitted to
the Visa network by the fraudulent Internet pharmacists. The plaintiffs asserted
that these banks, although headquartered outside the United States, could be
sued in the United States for knowingly participating in a conspiracy that both
depended on critical resources within the United States and caused widespread
harm to American consumers. Plaintiffs further alleged that because the banks
were part of a global conspiracy, any single defendant’s constitutionally
sufficient contacts with Virginia would subject every coconspirator to personal
jurisdiction in Virginia.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">To justify
personal jurisdiction over the foreign banks, the plaintiffs contended that the
Internet “pharmacists” deliberately transmitted spam emails over the Internet,
seeking to sell prescription drugs and aiming at email addresses that had been
“harvested” from web pages, including addresses of persons in Virginia, such as
the individual plaintiff. They argued that, based on this contact with
Virginia, the district court had jurisdiction over the pharmacists under Virginia’s
long arm statute and thus over the pharmacists’ coconspirators.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Plaintiffs
asserted that the court should apply a “conspiracy theory of personal
jurisdiction,” and thereby keep the foreign banks in the case. The court noted,
however, that conspiracy requires a “common plan,” and there were no
allegations that the banks’ processing of the transactions were designed to
achieve the illegal ends of the fraudulent pharmacists.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">In cases involving
Internet activity, the Fourth Circuit previously adopted a three-part inquiry
to determine whether a defendant is subject to jurisdiction in a state because
of its electronic transmissions to that state. As set forth in a 2002 Fourth Circuit
decision, <i>ALS Scan v. Digital Serv.
Consultants</i>, 293 F.3d 707, the inquiry considers:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">1) the extent to
which the defendant purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the state; <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">2) whether the
plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those activities directed at the state; and <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">3) whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Plaintiffs
failed to show any sufficient connection between the foreign banks and Virginia.
Not one of the banks directed its business to Virginia or aimed its commercial
efforts at customers in Virginia, and there was no indication that any of the banks
acted in such a way as to subject itself to the sovereign power of a court in
Virginia. Finally, there was no evidence that any drug transactions involving
the plaintiffs were connected by intermediaries to these foreign banks. There
was no legal basis for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign
banks and to do so would be unconstitutional.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Here’s
a link to the case: </span><a href="http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/112406.P.pdf" target="_blank"><span style="background: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/112406.P.pdf</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-12470206270208094302013-05-06T14:13:00.000-07:002013-05-06T16:31:01.102-07:00Ripken Baseball Sex Discrimination Case - Arbitration Clause Not Enforceable<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">In a recent decision, <i>Raglani v. Ripken Professional Baseball</i>, the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland denied an employer’s motion to dismiss or
stay and compel arbitration in a gender discrimination action brought by a
former employee. The decision rested on two grounds: 1) there was insufficient
consideration for agreement, i.e., a mutual exchange of promises to arbitrate;
2) the requirement of a neutral forum was not met. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">Briefly, the case involved an action under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Maryland state law, alleging that the
plaintiff was unfairly terminated for engaging in a romantic relationship with
a subordinate, when, despite a company policy forbidding such relationships,
she alleges several of her male counterparts engaged in sexual relations with
their subordinates and never were reprimanded. The plaintiff’s action also
alleged negligence, wrongful discharge and breach of contract. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">Upon her hiring, the plaintiff was required to sign a
Problem Support Policy Acknowledgement and Agreement (“PSP”), which stated it
was “‘a valid and binding legal obligation … in consideration of [her] hiring
for employment or [her] continued employment … .’” The PSP stated it was a
“procedure” to be used by “‘[a]nyone who feels they have a problem that
requires management’s attention.’” The court provided a pointed criticism of what
it characterized as an unbalanced agreement: “The PSP is entirely one-directional,
binding employees to dispute resolution procedures …. but silent on [the
employer’s] obligations to do anything other than “facilitate” this process in
the event an employee submits a ‘problem’ to management.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">The “binding arbitration” provision in the company’s PSP
stated:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">Human Resources will provide
a list of qualified Arbitrators upon a formal request to move to this step. … The
rules of the arbitration will be subject to the Federal Arbitration Act and
agreed to by both parties. … [Employer] will assume responsibility for the
costs of the Arbitrator. If the [employee] decides to have their attorney
present, the cost of that attorney will be the responsibility of the [employee].
After the meeting, the Arbitrator will submit a decision in writing and this
decision shall be final.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">The court found the arbitration provision defective
and unenforceable because by giving the employer exclusive control over the
list of arbitrators, it denied one party (the employee) access to a neutral,
arbitral forum. The court also stated that the arbitration provision was too
vague with regard to establishing rules by which arbitration would be
conducted. (The provision does state that arbitration rules would be subject to
the Federal Arbitration Act, but the FAA does not establish rules.) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">While the court addressed the potential for bias where
one party has the authority to limit the arbitrator selection process, something
not discussed is the exponential bias one might imply from the fact that the
employer both circumscribed arbitrator selection and assumed sole responsibility
for paying the arbitrator. Given this pairing of control and monetary power,
the arbitrator could be viewed as the employer’s “hired gun.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">A link to the decision is here: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<a href="http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Opinions/Raglani%2016%20April%202013.pdf" target="_blank"><span style="background: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Opinions/Raglani%2016%20April%202013.pdf</span></a><b><span style="font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-29115829903224377012012-07-17T12:43:00.000-07:002012-07-17T12:43:20.572-07:00Anti-SPAM Ruling: Maryland Federal Jury Decides that Beyond Systems, Inc. is Not a Bona Fide ISP<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0in;">
I have handled cases defending
companies and individuals being accused of sending SPAM emails. The usual plaintiff company was Beyond
Systems, Inc. Beyond Systems claimed
that it was an interactive service provider (ISP) and that it was negatively affected
by SPAM emails. The cases I handled were
for small companies and individuals that lacked sufficient resources to defend
the cases – so the cases were settled (relatively inexpensively) in order to
avoid paying what would have been substantial legal fees to defend the cases through
trial.<o:p></o:p></div>
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In the very good news for the world
category: someone finally had enough financial resources to defend one of these cases all the way through to trial,
and last month a jury in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland ruled that Beyond Systems was not an ISP. If Beyond is not an ISP under the Maryland Act (MCEMA), then it should not be entitled to bring any cases against alleged spammers under a <u>Gordon v. Virtumundo</u> case. (I cited the <u>Virtumundo</u> case to the same Court in 2007, but
on a preliminary motion, which the Court denied. I blogged about the issues here: <a href="http://rockvillelaw.blogspot.com/2007/09/new-developments-in-anti-spam-law-spam.html" target="_blank">Previous Blog Post</a>)<o:p></o:p></div>
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From here, the Court will now decide
whether or not the case may proceed at all given the jury’s finding. Hopefully, this is the end for Beyond Systems' and its owner’s extortionate litigation tactics.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Lawyers at Venable defended the case for Connexus Corp. Their news release about the case is here: <a href="http://www.venable.com/files/upload/Beyond_Systems_July-2012.pdf" target="_blank">Venable News Release</a>.</div>
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The Washington Post wrote about the case here: <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/crime-scene/post/jury-says-md-computer-company-not-bona-fide-to-sue-over-spam/2012/06/28/gJQASeuNAW_blog.html" target="_blank">Washington Post Article.</a></div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-5904374935887801802012-07-12T07:26:00.002-07:002012-07-12T07:42:28.122-07:00Thousands of Collection Suits Dismissed by Maryland District CourtThe District Court of Maryland, Maryland's court of general jurisdiction in civil cases up to $30,000.00, dismissed 3,564 collection cases on Tuesday after reaching a settlement with the debt collection agencies involved. The State will also receive $1 million. <br />
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The settlement came after the State had claimed that the the collection agencies violated state and federal laws and submitted false or misleading documentation with the courts. <br />
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<a href="http://goo.gl/KOe5l" target="_blank">Press Release</a>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-74043735295395273242012-05-21T11:00:00.000-07:002012-05-21T11:00:39.062-07:00Bit Torrent John Doe Cases Limited by Maryland's Federal Court; Risk of Extortionate Settlements Too Great<div style="text-align: justify;">
In the past year, I have handled several Bit Torrent file-sharing cases. </div>
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Recently, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (Judge Chasanow) in <strong><u><a href="http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Opinions/11-3007%20Severance%20Memo.pdf" target="_blank">Third Degree Films v. Does 1-108</a></u></strong> ruled that copyright plaintiffs may not join multiple “John Doe” defendants in a single copyright infringement case that alleges copyright infringement via “Bit Torrent” file-sharing. </div>
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The plaintiff was suing 108 John Doe defendants for the alleged infringement of a porn film. Plaintiffs in such cases used Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 20 as the basis for joining multiple defendants in one case. This allowed the plaintiffs to pay a single $350.00 filing fee to sue hundreds of defendants, and allowed those plaintiffs to save on legal fees as well. </div>
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The Court held that: “the risk of extortionate settlements is too great to ignore,” that “the risk of inappropriate settlement leverage is enhanced in a case . . . involving salacious and graphic sexual content where a defendant may be urged to resolve a matter at an inflated value to avoid disclosure of the content the defendant was accessing,” and that the “prejudice, expense, or delay” of joining such defendants substantially outweigh the convenience of such joinder. </div>
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This may be a significant blow to the porn companies and legitimate movie studios that have been using joinder of dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of John Doe defendants to make their cases economically feasible. The filing fee for a federal case with 100 defendants is $350.00. The filing fee for a case with one defendant is $350.00. If the copyright plaintiff wants to sue 100 defendants, it will now have to pay $35,000.00 in filing fees to initiate a case that last month cost only $350.00. </div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-7146066113322194602012-05-18T09:04:00.001-07:002012-05-18T09:05:37.639-07:00Maryland Court of Appeals: Maryland Courts Can Divorce Same-Sex Couples; Maryland Legislature Suffers From Multiple Personality Disorder<div style="text-align: justify;">
On May 18, 2012, in <b><u><a href="http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2012/69a11.pdf" target="_blank">Port v. Cowan</a></u></b>, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided that parties to a California same-sex marriage could be divorced by a Maryland Circuit Court. The Court decided that based on the doctrine of comity, which allows laws and judicial decisions of one state to be recognized by another state out of deference and respect, the California marriage was subject to dissolution through Maryland’s divorce proceedings. This ruling is based on the Court determining that same-sex marriage is not “repugnant” to the public policy of the State of Maryland. </div>
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In making this ruling, the Court of Appeals found that the Maryland Legislature was suffering from “multiple personality disorder.” The Court said that this “lay-diagnosis” is based on the Maryland Code (section 2-201 of the Family Law Article) currently defining marriage as being between only a man and woman; and the many other statutes protecting same-sex couples from discrimination in employment, health care, and estate planning. </div>
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A copy of the opinion is here: <a href="http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2012/69a11.pdf">http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2012/69a11.pdf</a><a href="http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2012/69a11.pdf"></a></div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-77874623077848126972011-10-12T07:26:00.000-07:002011-10-13T18:34:48.193-07:00New Maryland Case on Attorney's Fee Awards - Fixed Percentage Fees in Promissory Notes & Post-Judgment Attorney Fee Awards<div align="justify">The Maryland Court of Special Appeals recently addressed an issue that affects lawyers and other contract and promissory note drafters. In <strong>Suntrust Bank v. Goldman</strong>, the Court ruled that actual reasonable attorneys' fees incurred are the proper measure of an attorney fee award even where the promissory note calls for a fixed percentage fee based on the amount of the obligation due.<br /><div align="justify"></div><br /><div align="justify">In the case, Sunstrust's Credit Line agreement provided that Suntrust was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees equal to 15% of the principal due "or reasonable attorneys' fees allowed by law." Suntrust asked for an award of $60,206.00 (15% of the balance due) and the Circut Court for Baltimore County awarded actual attorneys' fees of only $3,094.00.</div><br /><div align="justify"><br /><div align="justify">The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Circuit Court. The Court's opinion is <a href="http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/cosa/2011/803s10.pdf">here. </a>Specifically, the Court held: "Thus, Maryland law limits the amount of contractual attorneys fees to actual fees incurred, regardless of whether the contract provides for a greater amount. The contract may provide that the amount of fees is determined by a percentage or some other method, but to comply with the indemnification requirement, the amount of fees paid pursuant to the agreement between the claimant and its attorneys must equal or exceed the amount provided for in the contract." </div><br /><p align="justify">The Court also dealt with the issue of attorneys' fee awards for post-judgment collection efforts, and seemingly recommended that if a creditor wanted to be able to pursue reimbursement for post-judgment colection efforts, it could include clear language in its agreements providing that the parties intend that the attorneys' fee provision shall not merge into a judgment on the agreement.</p></div></div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-87339120845598591882011-09-26T08:09:00.000-07:002011-09-26T08:18:50.356-07:00New Business & Technology Opinion - Montgomery County Circuit Court<div align="justify">The Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, Judge Ronald Rubin, recently issued an opinion in the Hospitality Partners, LLC v. Brewmasters Hotel, LLC case. </div><br /><div align="justify"></div><br /><div align="justify">The case is summarized and linked to by Edward Sharkey of the Maryland State Bar Association's Business Law Section at <a href="http://bit.ly/r5Jx0h">http://bit.ly/r5Jx0h</a>. </div><br /><br /><div align="justify">In the case, the Defendant argued (on a motion for new trial) that a $2.8 million judgment was inappropriate where there was a contractual clause allowing the Defendant to terminate a contract without cause and calling for a termination payment far below the $2.8 million awarded. </div><br /><div align="justify"></div><br /><div align="justify">The court held that the Defendant did not argue applicability of that clause at trial, and could not do so now on a motion for new trial. In essence, the Defendant was stuck with its decision to try and terminate the contract "for cause."</div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-6469691564570472512011-09-07T13:07:00.000-07:002011-09-07T13:32:30.196-07:00Maryland Court of Special Appeals: Perpetual Waiver of Statute of Limitations Unenforceable<div align="justify">In 2009, I helped my partner David Lease try the case of Ahmad v. Eastpines Terrace Apts. in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In that case, the plaintiff sued a company owned by his elderly father alleging that he was entitled to payment for services allegedly rendered to the company, and for amounts allegedly advanced on behalf of the company.<br /><br />Defendant denied owing anything to Mr. Ahmad, and argued that even if any amounts <em>ever</em> had been due Plaintiff for his claims, those claims were barred by Maryland's three year statute of limitations. Plaintiff argued that a document he drafted and had his elderly father sign waived the statute of limitations. [The document had been drafted in English, and Plaintiff's father could not read English]<br /><br />At trial, the Circuit Court held that the document did not perpetually waive the statute of limitations, and that in any event, a perpetual waiver would be against public policy and unenforceable. Judgment was entered in favor of our client on all of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.<br /><br />The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court. The appellate Court held that the document in question did not specifically say that it waived limitations perpetually, and that even if it did, perpetual waivers of limitations would be unenforceable under Maryland law.<br /><br />A copy of the opinion is <a href="http://www.courts.state.md.us/opinions/cosa/2011/1043s09.pdf">here</a>.</div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-37999335043884598142011-09-07T12:56:00.000-07:002011-10-13T12:05:56.413-07:00New Case on Attorneys' Fee Awards<div align="justify">The Maryland Court of Special Appeals today decided Friolo v. Frankel, which will be known as Friolo IV because it is the fourth appeal of this case on the issue of attorneys' fees in a wage payment and collection case under Maryland law.<br /><br />The opinion is <a href="http://bit.ly/pmHinV">here</a>.<br /><br />It is likely that none of the parties in the case are happy with the result. According to Plaintiffs' counsel, they have billed hundreds of thousands of dollars in this case, but were only awarded a fraction of those fees. Defendants have spent similar amounts and the result of the case requires that they pay Plaintiffs the original (small) judgment in the case and more than four times that much in legal fees to the Plaintiffs' counsel.<br /></div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-40000498365584509682011-05-05T11:20:00.000-07:002011-05-05T11:29:13.406-07:00Maryland Court of Appeals Rules: "Landlord - No License, No Rent Case"<p align="justify">For a long time I have wondered how the Maryland Court of Appeals would rule in a summary ejectment (rent case) landlord-tenant case if the tenant challenged the validity of the suit based on the landlord’s lack of a license required by the local jurisdiction where the property is located. On May 4, 2011, the Court of Appeals ended my speculation. In McDaniel v. Baranowski, (copy <a href="http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2011/64a10.pdf">here)</a> the Court ruled that a landlord without a license to rent his or her property cannot bring a summary ejectment action against the tenant.<br /><p align="justify">In light of the McDaniel case, every tenant lawyer will be searching the licensing records of the landlord to see if the rent case can be dismissed on a preliminary motion. Every landlord would be wise to make sure that all licensing requirements are followed.<br /><p align="justify">A question remaining is what happens next if you are a landlord? How can you remove your tenant for failing to pay rent if you are not licensed? Well, the Court seems to say that as long as the landlord obtains a license and pleads and proves that licensure in Court, the landlord can proceed. Therefore, the landlord appears to be able to cure the defect; and even though the landlord was not licensed at the time of the lease to the tenant, a newly licensed landlord may sue for possession after a tenant’s failure to pay rent.<br /></p>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-22341406604168077382011-03-22T11:59:00.000-07:002011-03-22T12:03:46.708-07:00Negligent Hiring/Negligent Retention Claims not Barred by Workers' Compensation Law<div align="justify">A common issue encountered in running a business is the application of the Workers’ Compensation laws. These laws provide for benefits to be paid to injured employees, and preclude employees from suing their employers for such injuries. Employers have, on occasion, sought to use these Workers’ Compensation laws to further narrow the scope of claims that an employee may bring. </div><div align="justify"><br />On March 21, 2011, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided Ruffin Hotel Corporation of Maryland v. Gasper. In Ruffin Hotel, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County had dismissed Plaintiff’s negligent hiring/retention claim after finding that the cause of action was barred due to preemption by the State’s Workers’ Compensation laws. The Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals reversed, finding that the Workers’ Compensation laws did not preclude an employee from suing an employer for negligent hiring/retention of a fellow employee. </div><div align="justify"><br />After the Court of Special Appeals’ decision, both parties sought review in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that: “We reject the proposition that the General Assembly intended the Workers’ Compensation Commission is the exclusive forum in which a negligent hiring/retention claim must be litigated whenever such a claim is asserted by an employee against his or her employer as a result of intentional and unlawful misconduct of a fellow employee.” </div><div align="justify"><br />A copy of the decision is found <a href="http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2011/24a09.pdf">here. </div><br /></a>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-71378816238344425662011-02-16T09:16:00.000-08:002011-02-16T09:21:42.526-08:00Reported Maryland Court of Special Appeals Case on Personal Jurisdiction: Owning Unimproved Real Estate is not Sufficient Minimum Contacts<div align="justify">An issue that often is litigated is personal jurisdiction, or “can we sue the defendant here?” Last week, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals rendered a published opinion on the issue in the case of Cappel v. RIASO, LLC. A copy of the opinion is <a href="http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/cosa/2011/2727s09.pdf">here</a>. In this case, the court was asked to determine whether, in an action to enforce a confession of judgment clause in a guarantee of a promissory note that was signed outside of the State of Maryland, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland had personal jurisdiction over the guarantors (Mr. & Mrs. Cappel) by virtue of their owning unimproved real estate in Maryland that was unrelated to the issues in the case. The Circuit Court had found that it did have jurisdiction over the Cappels because by owning the land the Cappels were “transacting business” in Maryland and they had sufficient “minimum contacts” with the State of Maryland to allow personal jurisdiction. </div><div align="justify"><br />The Court of Special Appeals reversed and vacated judgments against the Cappels for $2,938,312.51. The Court found that owning unimproved real estate in the State of Maryland was not sufficient to allow for personal jurisdiction in Maryland where the real estate in question had nothing to do with the dispute between the parties. </div><div align="justify"><br /></div><div align="justify">This means that the Plaintiff will now need to start over and sue the Cappels in either D.C. or Virginia, and that the lien on the Cappel’s Maryland real estate that was created by the judgment will be vacated. One wonders whether the Cappels will be able to sell the property before the creditor is able to obtain a new judgment in D.C. or Virginia and then record it as a lien against the Cappels’ Maryland property. </div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-81968265649274547172011-02-15T09:22:00.000-08:002011-02-15T09:30:53.248-08:00New Fourth Circuit Opinion on Arbitration -- Appeal of Arbitrability Decision Divests Trial Court of Jurisdiction<div align="justify">I have addressed arbitration issues many times before on this Business Law Blog. They are important because so many agreements now contain mandatory arbitration clauses. On February 10, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion in the case of Levin v. Alms and Associates, Inc. A copy of the decision can be found <a href="http://bit.ly/ikyjIp">here</a>. In this case, the appellate court held that when a trial court order regarding arbitrability of a dispute was appealed, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction and cannot continue on to handle the case until the appeal is resolved. The appellate court reversed the trial court which had allowed what it believed was the “non-arbitrable” portion of the case to go forward while the appeal was pending. </div><div align="justify"><br />The appellate court also went on to decide that the trial court was wrong on the merits. That is, the appellate court held that the trial court was wrong to decide that certain claims were not subject to arbitration. </div><div align="justify"><br />Before including an arbitration provision in your business agreements, you should be sure to consult with counsel to determine whether such a provision is in your interest and to discuss the scope and effect of such a provision. </div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-65295706036233220472011-02-03T10:40:00.000-08:002011-02-03T10:56:08.193-08:00Dan Snyder v. The Washington City Paper -- Why Didn't Snyder Choose Home Field Advantage?<div align="justify">In a case of note, local businessman Daniel Snyder of Rockville/Potomac, MD brought a libel suit in New York against local free newspaper The City Paper. A link to the lawsuit is <a href="http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/SQLData.jsp?IndexNo=150015-2011">here</a>.</div><br /><div align="justify">There is obviously a lot being written about this case now. One issue that I have not seen any information on is the choice of forum/venue. Snyder sued in New York, when he is a Montgomery County, Maryland resident, and would presumably have "home field advantage" here in Rockville. Or, maybe he thought that his reputation locally was so bad that he had to seek a venue where fewer people (Judges and Jurors alike) have formed an opinion of him.</div><div align="justify"> </div><div align="justify"><br />I will wait and hope that the issue of venue/jurisdiction is litigated and that the case comes home to Rockville where it belongs.</div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-90201296423341241552011-01-15T14:50:00.000-08:002011-01-15T16:44:33.059-08:00Federal Court: Injunction Denied Where It Would Put Restaurant Out of Business<div align="justify">Franchisors often seek injunctions in situations where their franchisees are violating the terms of the operative franchise agreements. In a case pending before the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (Greenbelt) titled Prosperity Systems, Inc. v. Ali, the Pizza-Bolis franchisor (Prosperity) sued its franchisee (Ali) alleging various violations of the parties’ franchise agreement. Specifically, Prosperity alleged that Ali advertised outside of his limited territory and that he used an unauthorized website. Prosperity sought an injunction that would have shut down Ali’s restaurant. The Court found that Prosperity was likely to win the case, and that Ali almost certainly was in breach of the franchise agreement. Nevertheless, the Court denied the request for an injunction finding that that the damage that Ali would suffer if the injunction was entered and the restaurant was shut down would outweigh the damage caused to the franchisor, Prosperity, resulting from Ali’s breaches of the agreement. A copy of the opinion is found <a href="http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Opinions/Prosperity%20Sys%20Opinion%2015dec10.pdf">here</a>. </div><br /><div align="justify">This shows a litigant that even where one can prove a breach of contract that does not mean that the court will necessarily grant an injunction barring further breaches of that contract; nor will a court shut down a business if lesser restrictions are available. </div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-38036221046735322052011-01-14T06:53:00.000-08:002011-01-14T07:02:48.838-08:00Attorney's Fee Request Denied in Unusual Citizenship Case<div align="justify">On January 13, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided the case of Cody v. Caterisano. In this unusual case which deals with attorney’s fee awards, an Irish citizen enrolled at the United States Naval Academy. At the time, the Irish government was funding the cost of his attendance at the Academy. Once enrolled at the Academy, the Irish government indicated that it would not fund the cost of attendance. The student obtained alternative funding and continued to attend the Academy. Because the Irish government was not paying for his education, the student did not have any obligation to serve in the Irish military upon graduation from the Academy. The student decided that he wanted to serve in the United States Navy after graduation, and decided to apply for United States citizenship. His application for citizenship hinged upon whether or not attending the Naval Academy constituted serving honorably in an active-duty status during a period in which the Armed Forces of the United States were engaged in military operations involving armed conflict with a foreign force. The Naval Academy had initially completed a form indicating that the student’s attendance at the Academy constituted such “active-duty” status. Later, the Academy withdrew that form and reversed its position indicating that attending the Academy did not constitute active duty service. The USCIS, which decides immigration applications, failed to make a decision within the time allotted. <br /><br />The student then sued to obtain a decision on his application. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland (Baltimore) found that the student qualified for naturalization and the United States government did not appeal. <br /><br />The student then sought his attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) and the District Court denied that request. Under the EAJA, a victorious party to litigation against the Government may be entitled to an award of counsel fees “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified. . ..” The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the particular circumstances of the student’s case, the Government’s position in contesting naturalization, while ultimately unsuccessful, was “substantially justified.” <br /><br />This is another example of courts being hesitant to award attorneys’ fees, and being restrictive in awards, whether the basis for the request for the attorneys’ fee award is statutory or contractual. The opinion is found <a href="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/092166.P.pdf">here</a>. </div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-2587697486646909452010-12-13T10:23:00.001-08:002011-01-17T08:48:21.182-08:00Health Care Statute Exceeds Congressional Power<div align="justify">The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia today held that a portion of the Health Insurance Reform Act is unconstitutional. Specifically, in Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, the Court held that Section 1501 of the Act: the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision exceeded the power of Congress granted to Congress in the Commerce Clause. A copy of the opinion is found <a href="http://www.vaag.com/PRESS_RELEASES/Cuccinelli/Health%20Care%20Memorandum%20Opinion.pdf">here</a>.<br /><br />The Minimum Essential Coverage Provision essentially penalized individuals who did not purchase at least a minimal level of health insurance. The United States argued that the Provision was in the nature of a tax, but the Court agreed with the Commonwealth of Virginia which argued that the Provision was in the nature of a penalty.</div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-13779473902768595142010-11-14T18:26:00.000-08:002010-11-14T20:29:16.755-08:00Federal Court Jurisdiction - Non-Compete CaseA question that often arises in litigation practice is: where do we file suit? We often have a choice of federal or state court. To sue in federal court, one needs either a federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction where there is $75,000.00 or more in controversy and the parties are citizens of different states. In JTH Tax Inc. v. Frashier, decided on November 10, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision regarding the amount in controversy for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a). In the case, Plaintiff JTH Tax had originally sued a former franchisee in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for $80,000.00, and for an injunction for breaches of contract arising out of a franchise agreement including breaches of non-compete obligations. Later, the Plaintiff filed documents with the court showing that its actual monetary damages were only approximately $60,000.00. The District Court dismissed the case on its own motion due to its determination that the amount in controversy was conclusively less than $75,000.00. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that District Courts could only dismiss in such cases where there was “legal certainty” that the amount in controversy was less than $75,000.00. The Court found many ways that the controversy could be valued in excess of $75,000.00 even where money damages were only $60,000.00. One such way was to value the injunctive relief sought.<br /><br />A copy of the full opinion is <a href="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/092262.P.pdf">here</a>.Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4989006301965570235.post-58744962545157158262010-11-12T13:20:00.000-08:002011-01-17T08:45:37.264-08:00New Maryland Court of Appeals Case on Contractual Attorneys' Fees<div align="justify">In the recent Monmouth Meadows Homeowners Association v. Hamilton case, a copy of which can be found <a href="http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2010/43a09.pdf">here</a>, the Maryland Court of Appeals clarified the method by which trial courts can calculate attorneys’ fee awards in contractual fee-shifting cases (as distinguished from statutory fee-shifting cases). Specifically, the Court held that the “lodestar” method of calculating attorneys’ fees does not apply to contractual fee-shifting cases, and that, instead, courts must look to the standard for determining appropriate attorneys’ fees under Rule 1.5 of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct. While the distinction may seem subtle, a fee award under lodestar can be quite different from a fee award under Rule 1.5. That is because a fee award under the lodestar method of calculation takes into account the “importance of the right vindicated.” This means that in an appropriate case with a statutory fee-shifting clause a $10,000.00 judgment for money damages can justify a much larger fee award. In the contractual fee-shifting situation, the courts in Maryland will be required to review the fee requested in the context of the principal amount in controversy in the litigation. Therefore, in a breach of contract case where $10,000.00 is at stake, it will be difficult for a court to justify a fee of $10,000.00.</div>Jeffrey D. Goldstein, Rockville, Maryland Business Lawyerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00851647903156237871noreply@blogger.com0